1:00 p.m. eastern each day with coverage on c-span3 and c-span radio and that c-span.org. listen and that your comments. coverage starts monday morning live on c-span with washington journal and continues through the day from the supreme court and then the oral argument on c-span3. .. >> so understanding that these two sort of categories exist allows you to think, okay, or

what are those factors that keep this virus moving, and what can we do as a world to end it? >> author craig timber tracks the history of aids sunday night at 9, part of a booktv weekend on c-span2. >> with the current health care legislation constitutional court cases being heard by the supreme court next week, booktv will be airing several author programs related to health care. at 9:30 a.m. eastern we bring you linda greenhouse. alec mcgillis is on after that discussing a series of essays on the recently-passed health care legislation. at about 11 a.m. eastern, jonathan gruber, the director of the health care program at the national bureau of economic research presents his thoughts on health care. his book is "health care reform: what it is, why it's necessary, how it works." and then we hear sally pipes'

perspective. she argues against president obama's health care initiative and presents her own plan. and our health care programming concludes with eric topel. he contends that digital technology can make medical care more effective. for a complete schedule of booktv's programming this weekend, visit booktv.org. up next on booktv, trita parsi looks at the obama administration's diplomacy towards iran over the past three years and argues that domestic politics in both countries have negatively impacted the chances for relations. this is about an hour, 20 minutes. [applause] >> thank you so much. it's always a great pleasure coming to busboys and poets. i'm forever indebted to andy and his fantastic team not only for this invitation, but all of the

fantastic work that they've done for peacemaking in these last decades. one day i know andy will get the nobel peace prize -- [laughter] and he will fully deserve it. [applause] as will his entire team. thank you, also, for that introduction. as it was said, i'm here to talk about the obama administration's iran policy. we've seen this issue come up once again on top of the agenda, and the perception that perhaps existed someplace is that the risk of war had been essentially eliminated by the election of barack obama, clearly has turned out not to be true. so we're in some ways back where we started, and i think the book gives a good understanding of why we have ended up here. the book is based on dozens of interviews both with key people and obama administration people in congress and in the senate who worked on this issue, but also with almost all of the international actors who have been involved in this ranging

from the iranians, the brazilians and the turks, the european actors as well as saudi arabia, israel and other states that have a very keen interest and a stake in this issue. so let me start off by giving you a quote from obama himself. to the muslim world, we seek a new way forward based on mutual interest and mutual respect. to those who cling to power through corruption and deceit and the silencing of dissent, know that you are on the wrong side. but that we will extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist. only 12 and a half minutes into president barack obama's presidency, he reached out to iran and the larger muslim world offering america's hand of friendship if iran would unclench its fists. this was a bold move, not born out of desire, but born out of necessity. as far as we know, having conversations and diplomacy with

autocratic leaders of the iranian state was never a childhood dream of his, rather while some believed bush was pursuing wars of choice, obama had come to the conclusion that peace with iran was a necessity. the bush administration followed a policy that essentially said that diplomacy with america's enemies would be forbidden. it was diplomacy viewed as a reward, something you would only extend to the countries that deserved america's company. and by talking to other countries, essentially, you ran the risk of legitimizing their leaders, and in the case of iran, clearly, that was not something that the obama -- that the bush administration was interested. whatever one's view is of this ideology, though, the track record is quite clear. during the eight years in which there was no functioning, sustainable diplomacy between the united states and iran in which the bush administration thought it was punishing iran by

not talking to it, iran's influence in the region grew exponentially. first you had a situation in iraq and afghanistan, two states which leaders, whose leaders tended to be enemies of iran. suddenly they were now, iran was now the king maker this those two states. iran who only had a couple of dozen spinning centrifuges in 2003 had up to 8,000 by the end of 2008 when bush left office. and by challenging an increasingly unpopular america in the middle east, iran's soft power throughout the arab world was also expanding. against this backdrop, obama made something that no one else had done before. he made a promise of diplomacy with america's foes a central part of his torn policy platform. and talking to the iranians became the poster child of that platform. but under normal circumstances, it would have been a losing

card. in fact, politically suicidal. it now became a winning proposition precisely because of the american population's rejection of the bush foreign policy and the neoconservative ideology that it was based on. but time was short. the opening in the american political landscape this favor of diplomacy was limited, and obama understood this. iran's nuclear program was progressing, iran was amassing enriched uranium which could be used for the production of nuclear bombs. pressure from saudi arabia and israel against diplomacy was intensifying and started from the very minute obama came into power. the fear in those two states was that obama would strike a deal with iran that would legitimize or accept iran's growing influence in the region and leave these two states abandoned in dealing what they perceived to be an iranian threat. the e.u. was also, by and large, at one point positive about obama's outreach but also a

little bit worried about what it could lead to. would the e.u. be cut out, and would obama be so eager to strike a deal that he would actually redefine the west's red lines when it came to the nuclear issue. and, of course, hanging over obama's head was the potential of an israelly strike against -- israeli strike against iran. the obama administration at that time and continues to do so today viewed as absolutely disastrous for the region as a whole and for the u.s. interests. of all of america's key allies, many of them wished obama well, but very few of them wished obama success. and after 30 years of enmity between the united states and iran, it was very clear to obama that something needed to, first, happen when it came to the atmospherics because in iran the united states was a great -- [inaudible] and in the united states iran

was part of the axis of evil. that type of language was not conducive for the success of diplomacy. more than anything else, first, the language needed to change. and obama did a remarkable shift in this stance in the sense that much of bush's vocabulary on iran was eradicated within the first few weeks of obama coming into power. and i think the boldest move in this regard was the unprecedented video message that president obama sent to the iranian people and the iranian government on the eve of the iranian new year in march 2009. in that message in which he addressed both the people and the government, referenced the government as the islamic republic essentially signaling that the obama administration was not spent on regime -- intent on regime change, he spoke of the need of bringing iran back into the fold of the community of nations. he poke of how the many -- he spoke of how the many problems

between the united states and iran could not be resolved through threats, a clear departure from the foreign policy of the bush administration. iran's response to this was quite swift. within a day the supreme leader of iran, ayatollah khomeini, gave a speech in his hometown. after first for about 40 minutes blasting the united states and all of the faults and all of the crimes that the u.s. had committed against iran from the iranian perspective, toward the end of that speech he left an opening. he said that if united states changes, then iran will change as well. this was a small but, perhaps, a critical opening. but it also signaled something else. the iranians' view that if any change were to occur between the united states and iran, it had to be strategic. it could not be tactical, and it could not just be rhetorical. changing the tone was not sufficient, there had to be a change in substance.

and so that point, the iranians argued, there had not been any evidence of any clear substance change in america's position. only a welcome and interesting change in the tone, but not enough to get the iranians fully excited. now, the obama administration also knew that it would be very difficult to engage the iranians before the iranian elections. the elections were scheduled to take place in june 2012, and already it took several months to actually finish this new policy, there was a policy review, and after the question was should the engage with iran before the elections or afterwards. at the end of it, the winning argument became that the u.s. did not want to do anything that unintentionally could effect the elections, particularly if it would effect the elections in favor of ahmadinejad. clearly, from the american perspective, um, seeing him not win the elections was preferable because of the political

toxicity of ahmadinejad in washington. so they didn't want to do anything that could actually help him. but what was critical about it was that the obama administration expected that by june 13th, a day after the elections, there would be political clarity in tehran. there would have been an election, someone would have won, a couple of others would have lost, and the u.s. could then quickly get on with the diplomatic initiative. what they did not expect was that there would be anything even the opposite of political clarity, because what you had in iran was an election that a lot of people -- in my view, correctly viewed -- as fraudulent, political infighting at an unprecedented level. essentially, iran had become politically paralyzed because of all of this infighting. and much critical time that the obama administration already had lost were now about to be lost

again. and this was critical for the obama administration because not only was all of these human rights abuses that you could see on the tv screen very problematic in the sense that time was lost, but it was also very critical because it started to create a little bit of a moral dilemma for the administration. how would it deal with this issue? at first, the obama administration was very timid. it took a full ten days before the administration came out and actually condemned the violence and the human rights abuses, and those condemnations and those references to the human rights situation in iran were very few and far in between. the iranian opposition in the sense of the green movement, i had the opportunity to interview several folks from the inner circumstance of, they were at mist pleased to see the u.s. did not take a strong position, and certainly not in favor of the greens. that is not what they wanted. but as time passed and they felt

that obama was being too quiet on the human rights front, a lot of fears started to emerge thinking that perhaps obama is so keen on getting a nuclear deal that he would actually be willing to sacrifice the rights and the democratic aspirations of the iranian people in the process. it never really got to that point though because of all of these difficulties. there was also an argument in the u.s. government that perhaps precisely because of the weakness of the iranian government an opportunity for a deal would actually be even greater. something had happened just a couple of days before the june elections that had given the obama administration significant hope that perhaps a deal on the nuclear issue could be struck. on june 2nd, ten days before the election, the iranians sent a letter to el bare elbaradei who

was the head of the atomic agency in yes geneva saying -- n vienna, i'm sorry, saying that the iranians wanted to buy fuel for the reactor given to iran by the united states 40 or so years ago that currently produces medical isotopes for approximately 900,000 patients in iran. and the iranians were running out of fuel for that. this was a very interesting proposal because since the beginning of the obama administration there had been several brainstorming sessions in which the key proposal, the key objective was to see how can the u.s. get low enriched uranium out of iran, and by that reduce iran's ability to be able to break out and potentially build a nuclear bomb. you need to have low-enriched uranium in order to do so. and various ideas and concepts were being developed on how they could make a deal with the

iranians without getting the leu out of the country. one of the issue z was -- sorry about this. is it good? the key issue about getting the leu out was because if there was a sense that they could reduce the iranian low-enriched uranium stockpile, then the political space and time for a deal would increase because there was a fear that if iranians were essentially having enough low enriched require -yard -- uranio build the bomb, the political pressure would be significant in washington. but if leu could be taken out, obama would gain time and political space. now, the beauty of the iranians themselves asking for the reactor was that half of the problem was solved. now the u.s. did not no longer need to convince the iranians to give up the leu for nothing but

rather they could give the proposal of saying instead of you buying the fuel, we'll take the leu, we'll turn it into fuel, that way both sides would win. it would be a confidence-building measure, it would give political time and space for diplomacy, it would give something positive it could show that diplomacy actually could work. and by the iranians themselves asking for it, the opening, essentially, had been delivered to the united states. elbaradei realized this. instead of doing what he should have done which was to inform all suppliers that the iranians wanted to buy fuel, instead he only informed the russians and americans about this. immediately, a proposal was in the making between the united states and russia in telling the iranians, we'll take your leu, we'll turn it into fuel pads, and you'll get it back. by september signals were being sent to iran that negotiations needed to be taking place on this issue. by october 1, 2009, for the first time the u.s. joined the

permanent members of the security council plus germany in meeting with the iranians in geneva to discuss this idea. fortunately, the iranians initially showed a lot of interest. they agreed in principle on the idea of a fuel swap. and they agreed to have another meeting sometime later on in october. by october 20th they remet at the technical level in vienna in which the main negotiation was taking place between the united states and iran in a multilateral setting. the idea was the russians would take iran's low-enriched uranium, turn it into 20% enriched uranium, send it off to the french, the french would turn it into fuel pads, and approximately 9-12 months later the iranians would get the fuel pads for their reactor in time before they would run out of fuel. here is where the problems begin. the iranians make the argument

that this proposition would put most of the risk on iran because the iranians would essentially be, um, giving up a strategic asset without getting anything in return until 12 months later. mindful of the significant doubts and mistrust that the iranians also have of the west. the mistrust is not just from the western side to iran. instead, they gave a couple of suggestions including the idea that instead of giving up all of the leu at once they should give it up in three batches or two batches. every time a batch is given, the west would then in return provide the iranians with fuel pads. for various reasons, this could not work for the u.s. on a technical level, the problem was that these fuel pads are not something you can buy at kmart, this is something that actually takes some time to work out. no existing stockpile of them. so there was no readiness to be able to make this instantaneous.

but at the political level, also, there was a problem. the iranians had 1500 kilos of leu. you need approximately 1200 to build a bomb if you're really successful at your first goal. they needed to make sure that iran was as far away from having 1200 as possible. dividing it up into different batches arguably would not buy the obama administration the political space and time that was needed. at the end of a three-day negotiation, elbaradei realizes that they were on the verge of failure. instead of going out there and telling the press that they had failed, there was a gentlemen's agreement that he would go out and say that we're going to take a couple of more days, the proposition is going to be sent back to the respect i capitals -- respective capitals, and they're going to give an answer within three to four days. immediately, the united states, russia and france accept what is, in essence, their own deal. iran never came back with a

proper response. there was a request for additional meetings. what really made it difficult for the iranians to say yes was not necessarily this lack of trust or the technical problems. it was the fact that the political elite in iran was still at war with each other literally, and as a result it was very difficult for them to be able to come to a consensus on how to handle this. no one within iran's political elite opposed to ahmadinejad wanted to see him be able to score a political victory only a couple of months after the disputed elections. so almost everyone opposed to him also opposed the deal, and they made it impossible for the political elite to move forward. by end of november 2009, the united states decides to activate what was called the pressure track. in essence, diplomacy was deemed a failure, and diplomacy was abandoned. at that point the show moves

from washington, d.c. to new york, and the effort is to get a new u.n. security council resolution against iran. obama's promise of making sure that diplomacy could succeed within the first 12 months of him being in office, essentially, had been abandoned. and now the pressure was to make sure that as quickly as possible sanctions could be imposed on the iranians essentially to punish them, but officially to bring them back to the table. it turned out to be much more difficult than the obama administration had hoped for. resistance from russia, resistance from china was extensive. and what was originally believed to be a process that would only take about two-and-a-half months and sometime by february during the french presidency of the security council new sanctions could be adopted ended up taking all of march, all of april. but by sometime in may it was now clear that they were very close to some sort of an

agreement between the great powers to sanction iran. but right when they were about to do so, something else happened. an initiative that came from an unexpected direction changed the picture. turkey and brazil, who had been involved in this issue in the periphery, decided to give diplomacy another go. the brazilian president visits iran on may 16, 2009, determined to convince the iranians to agree to the american proposal and make sure that diplomacy could succeed. he's joined by the turks who had already prepared themselves by shuttling in their foreign minister in and out of tehran for several weeks trying to create something that would make sure that diplomacy would be given another shot. after 18 hours of intense negotiations, a deal is struck in which all of the key american

benchmarks from the 2009 proposal were met. all of the leu would be sent out in one batch, there would not be an instantaneous swap, the iranians would have to wait 12 months to be able to get their fuel pads, and the exchange would take place outside of iranian soil. an added component was that the iranian leu would actually be put in an escrow in turkey in order to resolve the trust deficit. if there was a violation of the deal, the iranians could get their leu back. and since iran's relationship with turkey is far better than its relationship with the united states or france, this was something that was deemed much more acceptable by the iranian political elite. the brazilians and the turks were jubilant. they had succeeded in something in a few months that france, britain, the europeans and others had failed at for several years. their diplomacy had succeeded.

what they did not know, however, was that the day before lula arrived in tehran, china and russia had already agreed to a new sanctions draft. so by the time the news comes out that turkey and brazil actually managed to get the iranians to agree to give up their leu, the had already been celebrating something else, the fact that now they had a u.n. sanctions agreement. the american response was swift. immediately, about five hours after the agreement was sealed, the brazilian president -- foreign minister calls secretary clinton to deliver the news and explain what had happened in the negotiations. to his surprise, she is not impressed and, essentially, rejects the deal. a day later in the u.s. senate at a hearing, she says that the united states has now got an agreement on a draft resolution which will be circulated that same afternoon, and she adds

that this is the clearest response to the events of this past weekend. pointing to the brazilian/turkish diplomacy. turkey and brazil were in shock as was tehran. they thought they had a deal. what was not in the news, however, until about two, three weeks later was that the turks and the brazilians had not done something that was entirely of their own initiative. there was a letter from president obama dated april 20, 2010, three weeks before lula arrive inside tehran in which president obama tells the leaders of turkey and brazil that if you can manage to get 1200 kilos of leu out of iran, that would be a significant confidence-building measure. that would be of great importance for the united states. furthermore, he endorses the idea of putting the leu in turkey as an escrow. the deal that the brazilians and

the turks got follows the instructions of this letter word by word almost. um, what it doesn't address is the fact that the leu count in iran over this period had increased. it was 1500 kilos in 2009. by the time the brazilians and turks got the deal, it was reaching 2400. so there was an argument on the american side that this deal had now, its expiration date had been reached. it was no longer valid because now the iranians would have 1200 kilos even if 1200 was taken out of the country. furthermore, the iranians had expanded their enrichment and were doing enrichment at 20%, something that the west viewed as a major provocation. these were not addressed by the turks and the brazilians in their negotiation with tehran, at least not in the final agreement. the obama administration said. and the obama administration was correct, these were not in the final deal. but nor were they in obama's

letter to the brazilians and too the turks three weeks earlier. this created a significant problem between the united states and turkey and brazil. but what it also showed is that at the end of the day diplomacy between the united states and the west and iran actually hadn't failed. it had been abandoned. the success actually came, but it came six months too late. but by that time the political space of the administration, according to one obama official that i interviewed, had essentially run out. congress was coming at the administration like a steam roller, and there was a very legitimate fear in the obama administration. if they did not agree to rejecting the turkish/brazilian deal and by that forgoing the u.n. security council sanctions, then congress would pass its own sanctions, and that would have created a significant conflict between the states permanent

five at the u.n. security council. and keeping a unity within the p5 against iran was a very central objective of the obama administration. congress would have destroyed that unity and instead iran would once again be able to take advantage of the fissures between the p5 members. but he also showed that political space for diplomacy as the obama administration from the outset knew was limited, could not grow on its own. one of the biggest mistakes in my assessment that the obama administration did was that it never actively went out to really argue for diplomacy and create political space for it. make a comparison between what bush was doing and what obama didn't do. the bush -- president bush gave, i think, about 16 speeches, major speeches in which he put forward the strategic rationale for why the united states must invade iraq. an additional 12 major

interviews with "meet the press" and other major news outlets by him or by dick cheney. compare that to the number of times that president obama came out and explained why it was critical for the united states, why it was in the national interest of the u.s. to actually, um, pursue diplomacy. there's only one instance that i could find, and that was during his first press conference with prime minister netanyahu of israel. tense, tense relations between obama and netanyahu. and at one point they're doing the press conference, obama explains the strategic rationale for diplomacy saying that this is the only option we have left. all other options have failed. but except for that all of the speeches or arguments in favor of diplomacy that obama presented he did while he was a candidate, not when he was president. and that means that there wasn't an active effort to really create political space, and i asked about this to several

people in the administration as well as some other friends in congress. there were moments in which leading senators had reached out to the president saying we're willing to give you political cover, we're willing to give you political space be. but the argument inside the white house was that the policy folks agreed with that and were welcoming it, but the political folks at the high levels felt that any national conversation about the iran policy would ultimately damage the obama administration in the upcoming congressional elections. and as a result, it was shunned. and the bottom line then means that there was no effort to create space for this policy. and, um, if you then compare this diplomatic effort by the administration to other diplomatic efforts that the united states have been involved in, it becomes as one obama administration official told me a gamble on a single role of the dice. it either had to work right away

or not at all, because we did not have the political space, or the administration felt they did not have the political space or political will to create that political space. but in all other major negotiations that the u.s. had been successful, never has diplomacy yielded any results on a single roll of the dice. when the u.s. negotiated with vietnam to restore relations, it took a full four years from 1990 to 1994. another six years to get a full trade agreement. all of this took place over the course of three presidencies. negotiations with libya to have them give up their nuclear program took a full seven years. negotiations in northern ireland to get the good friday agreement took more than 700 days, and there's a fantastic quote from senator mitchell who mediated that conflict. he said for 700 days neither side would agree to anything that the other side would agree to. but on the 701st day, they both

changed their minds. fortunately for those 700 first days the united states did not give up. and we're going to be in a situation in which as long as the political landscape in tehran and in washington is such that the political cost and risk for a leader to send thousands of women and men off to a war, to certain death -- probably an unnecessary war -- is less than for that same leader to send off a couple of dozen of diplomats to go and negotiate, then we're going to continue to have far more clenched fists between the united states and iran than extended hands. thank you so much. [applause] i don't know how much time we have for q&a, but i think probably a half hour or so. right in the back. >> oh. let me bring around, i'll bring around the microphone that way everyone can hear the question

that you ask, including dr. parsi, okay? >> hi. i just wanted to check your -- [inaudible] you talked about the letter from obama to the turks and the brazilians that was revealed after the fact. the fact that the instructions weren't changed, that nobody within the whole machinery worked out that there was more fuel that needed to be factored into the negotiation or the equation, what's your take on that? was there a coffer up or a -- cover up or a conspiracy? >> i don't think it was a conspiracy. i think, first of all, orally both secretary clinton, general jim jones had given different impressions to both the turks and the brazilians. the issue of the fact that there was a greater amount of

low-enriched uranium inside of iran had been brought up, and it had been brought up as a major problem. also the fact that the iranians were engaged in 20% enrichment had also been brought up as major problem. but here is the thing. the brazilians and the turks were hearing, essentially, different messages both from secretary clinton, jim jones and other elements in the obama administration. so as a result when there is a letter in writing signed by the president of the united states, i think it is understandable that their interpretation was that this letter is the final point, this is the final position of the u.s. government. you know, it wasn't signed by an intern. it was signed by the president. so their interpretation of that, i think, is quite clear. in the negotiations, however, they did bring up 20%. but they also realized that while the iranians gave some signals that they're open to ending that, they were not going to end that in a negotiation

with turkey and brazil. they were going to use that as a card for negotiation with the u.s. afterwards. and here's the very important thing to keep in mind, this idea of a fuel swap was originally an american idea, and it was never supposed to be the end of negotiations. it was never supposed to be the end state. it was supposed to be a confidence-building measure. in a negotiation you try confidence-building measures. if one doesn't work, you try another one. in this instance it became, essentially, confused with the final deal. it became a precondition for any future negotiations. the turkish/brazilian initiative was very clearly stated to be just an effort to be able to infuse enough confidence to get diplomacy back on track and get a new round of talks in which other issues would be addressed. there was never an ambition, it was never a statement that this in and of itself would be the

end of the nuclear file. of course, the iranians were eager to view it that way, but that wasn't the case. i think the iranians made a huge mistake in not accepting the 2009 deal. one can have many very compelling arguments why that deal would put iran at a disadvantage. but bottom line is this, for peacemaking you have to be willing to take a risk, and there's an unfortunate gravitation -- i don't know if it's the gravitation in humanity at large or whether it is in just some quarters -- in which we tend to be more inclined to take risks for war than peace. the obama administration failed in may 2010, iran failed in 2009. >> thank you, dr. parsi. me as an iranian-american, i work very hard for obama to become president. i'm not going to do it anymore

because absolutely i think -- [inaudible] one thing i want to mention, at the same time he gives a greeting to the iranian people for the new year, he renewed the sanctions. so you cannot say i'm greeting to you at the same time you're slapping the people. so that's why the iranians didn't see any good from america. you know, they're playing part for 32 years there are sanctions. i mean, at the same time for the brazilian and turkey and the 20% enrichment,. [inaudible] they said they're going to start the 20 %. they were talking about it, but they haven't started. and also america didn't think iranian going to accept the turkey and brazilian deal,

that's why they underneath they were going for the sanks in the united nations -- sanctions in the united nations. so in my opinion all i see there is no diplomacy, and all pressure -- [inaudible] so i don't see at this point in my opinion anti-war, anti-sanction. but if you lack at the iranian -- if you look at the iranian people, the sanctions pressuring the people, not the government. we have to realize that. sanctions is against the people of iran, it's not against the -- [inaudible] >> thank you. couple of points that you raised that i think are important to address. one quick correction. the iranians actually were enriching at 20% when the brazilians and turks were negotiating with iran. they had started it in february 2010.

um, they had said, the iranians had said that they would rather buy the fuel than have to create it themselves, and they make the argument, the mere fact that they were sending out a request to buying the fuel was an indication that they originally had no intent to go all the way up to 20%. but they were doing 20% at a time when the brazilians and the turks were talking to them. i think one could make the argument from the iranian side that the obama administration should have done something beyond changing the tone, although changing the tone is, i think we should be careful not belittling it. it's not as if iranians have been successful in changing their tone. it's pretty much back to the very same hostile discourse in iran as it was before. the expectation that either the u.s. or iran would actually give prior to a negotiation a significant concession is simply

unrealistic. mindful of the very hostile and be treacherous political landscape that exists on both sides. it's not going to happen. now, one could make the argument if one wants to be very cynical and say, well, that is an indication that obama wasn't serious. i know there were discussions in the obama administration about doing some of these things, but i think there was also a significant fear that if they did give a concession prior to the negotiations and the negotiations failed, it would cost them dearly politically at home. i think going forward neither side should have those expectations. ideally, it would be better. usually in a negotiation situation if there is a concession given prior to negotiations, it usually tends to create good will and a better atmosphere and a higher likelihood of success. but i fear simply not realistic. and i think there is a tendency on the iranian side and a tendency on this side, this is a

mutual tendency, in reading the other side's intentions and moves in the worst possible way. so obama comes and completely changes the language of the united states, and the overwhelming argument and sentiment in iran is, well, that's nice, but it's not enough because we still don't trust you. and it dose back to the idea are you willing to take a greater risk for peace than you're willing to take for just maintaining the status quo? the same is true over here. when the iranians actually agreed to the deal between turkey and brazil, the argument was, well, they just did that to avoid sanctions. yes, that's probably true. but also the purpose of the sanctions was to get them back to the negotiating table. what is it that we value the most, actually getting them to give up the leu or imposing sanctions on them? is imposing sanctions an end in and of itself, or is it a means? and i think precisely because of the tendency of reading the worst intentions into the other side, both sides essentially paralyzed themselves when it

comes to diplomacy. on the issue of sanctions, i agree with you, sanctions are far more hurting the iranian people than the government. it's not unusual. this is the case in most sanctions situation. it's always easier for a government to shift the pain of the sanctions onto the population. than on the government. and i think it is a very dangerous proposition because we're starting to reach a situation in which the intend of the sanctions -- the intent of the sakss is increasingly read by the government in iran as an existential threat. and when you are faced with that type of situation, particularly post what happened in libya, you're not likely to give in or give any concessions. so we have seen a tendency in the past that sanctions particularly at this level tends to increase the risk of war far more so than increase the probability of a resolution. >> [inaudible]

you spoke of the role that the israelis play in u.s./iran relations. could you speak about the fact that israel and their supporters in the u.s. have had on obama's diplomacy? >> thank you. um, i want to specify what i'm talking about then is the role of the more right-wing elements or perhaps one should say supporters of the liqud line. from the very beginning the israelis were not excited about obama winning for many reasons. one was he was an untested card, they didn't really know who he was. there was a fear that he would be sympathetic to the palestinians, and he had made diplomacy with iran a key element of his foreign policy platform. in an interview with the then-foreign minister of israel on israeli radio in which he says that in this region a willingness to talk is oftentimes seen as a sign of weakness. and the reporter then asked her

does that mean that you oppose obama's proposition to speak to iran? and she leaves no doubt, she says i oppose it. clear as that. and from the very beginning once the netanyahu government comes into office, there is an effort to make diplomacy, um, fail essentially to be frank, and there was three or four different variables that the israelis were playing with. first, they were making the argument that the only way for diplomacy to be acceptable is that it can only last 12 weeks. results have to come within the first 12 weeks. so what sanctions have failed to do with iran in 30 years diplomacy miraculously needed to fix and achieve in 12 short weeks. secondly, diplomacy was only acceptable if outcome was the iranians giving up their nuclear program, essentially going back to zero enrichment objective, an objective that the obama

administration at least publicly had not endorsed. so what you have there is two efforts to make the success bar for diplomacy so high that it essentially would guarantee failure. beyond that the israelis were pushing for sanctions to be passed by congress and the u.s. before diplomacy was taking place knowing very well that that would also undermine and reduce the chances of success and, finally, an insistence that the military option is on the table. the israeli argument being, and it's incidentally an argument that now has been adopted by the obama administration which is the iranians will only respond favorably if they're faced with an imminent military threat. contrast that to the message in which obama said the problems between the united states and iran would not be resolved through threats. so these were four variables that the israelis were playing with from the very outset in which they were essentially undermining the chances of

success. but problems did not only come from there, also the saudis were problematic about it. but i would make the argument, though, that the biggest blow to the obama administration's political space in their own assessment did not come from what the israelis were doing or what the saudis or others were doing, it actually came from what happened in iran over the summer 2009 with the election dispute, the massive human rights abuses that was vividly shown all over the world news because every activist in iran had become a journalist by being able to take pictures and putting it on youtube. that created a bigger problem at the end of the day, i think, than what the israelis did. >> [inaudible] and what role has the -- [inaudible] played since the obama administration took over. >> the reference is to an organization called the

mujahideen, it's an iranian terrorist organization on the u.s.' terrorist list, an organization that back in the '70s had a following in if iran, was somewhat popular, actually was quite popular but since 1980s actually sided with saddam hussein and be his invasion of iraq, lost a tremendous amount of support amongst the iranian population and since then has become increasingly cultish and marginalized. they've had -- they're on the terrorist list in the u.s., but they're the only terrorist organization that i know of that actually have a massive lobbying campaign on capitol hill and gets, puts, you know, bus ads in d.c., has fund raisers at the mci center and other places. it's quite amazing. and you actually have significant former u.s. officials who in spite of this group being on the terrorist list is speaking out on their behalf in return for major speaking fees up to about

$80,000. our understanding was that there was a legal decision that said that they have their terrorist status had to be reviewed by the end of 2011, and after that the state department needed to reissue either keeping them on the list or taking them off the list. so far no decision seems to have come out. i'm not really clear on what the legalities of this is because every organization on the terrorist list has a right to have its case reviewed and, in fact, usually takes place automatically. but i think their impact on the obama administration has not been particularly significant. it's not been a major factor. if they're taking -- taken off the list, however, obviously that could change. >> economic sanctions on iran under any circumstances because it is hurting the people. two, you also can't -- not you, but you always have to negotiate

with your enemy. the question i have is more informational, i don't have an opinion on this, just need your expertise. did ahmadinejad say that he wanted to wipe israel off the map, or was that something that he did not say or was inaccurate and sort of made up by the right-wing press? and, two, if it is true that he said that, what would be, you know, the president of a country's logic of promulgating that kind of a position when you're dealing already with a hostile world community, and you're trying to deal with a nuclear weapon? i mean, what's the truth behind all that? >> thank you. um, what ahmadinejad said at that conference in persian did not contain the word "israel," did not contain the word "map,"

did not continue the word "wipe off." however, it's important to keep this in mind. what ahmadinejad was trying to do was to quote khomeini from a statement that he had given back in the early 1980s. it was not the right-wing media who had mistranslated that as wiping israel off the map, it was actually the iranian translators themselves who had mistranslated that back in the 1980s sprk when ahmadinejad repeated it even though he misquoted khomeini, the same iranian translation was spread. and, of course, it caught wildfire, and ever since it's become, you know, presented as the slogan of ahmadinejad. bottom line is even if that statement was mistranslated, the iranians have been saying things of a very similar nature for quite some time. khomeini himself and khamenei afterwards have said israel is a

cancer in the region, and in order to save the patient, you have to remove the tumor. so the fact that there is extremely venomous rhetoric coming from the iranians against israel is undeniable. now, what is important, however, is are these statements clear indications of policy? was there a clear intent delivered on who needs to take away the tumor if one were to use that metaphor? moreover, is iran an existential threat against israel as a result, and there i think you end up in a very different interpretation because fact of the matter is that back in the 1980s, back at a time when the iranians were actually making these type of statements with far greater frequency and probably even worse statements, it was israel back then who was lobbying in favor of iran in washington d.c. the israelis were then making the argument to the reagan administration that the united states needs to talk to iran, that it needs to sell arms to iran and that it should not take iranian rhetoric seriously

because it's not reflected in policy. and this was done because of geopolitical interests of israel and iran at the time that coincided. the israelis were probably one of the few states in the region and beyond that actually were supporting the iranians against saddam's invasion of iran, fearing that if iraq had defeated iran, it would change the map of the middle east in a way that would be quite detrimental to israel. moreover, the real change in the israeli posture vis-a-vis iran comes in the 1980s -- '90s which had less to do with iranian rhetoric but more to do with the changes that took place in the region with the defeat of saddam hussein by the u.s. and the u.n. coalition and the collapse of the soviet union. so what you have is a much clearer, in my assessment, geopolitical rivalry between these two, and both sides are using rhetoric and ideology as a tool to be able to get their own constituency on their side in this conflict. what is dangerous, though, is

that they seem to have no care whatsoever about how their rhetoric is read on the other side. the iranians don't seem to take much care at all about how these type of statements are read in the west. just as much as the united states and the israelis are not paying too much attention as to how their rhetoric is read in the muslim world. for instance, when condoleezza rice at the height of israel's war in lebanon in 2006 said that these are the birth pangs of the new middle east, how was that viewed by the middle eastern audience? probably extremely negatively. but we didn't even have them in mind when we formulated these talking points, and the iranians don't seem to care at all about how these type of statements are creating very strong emotional and very negative reactions and making any probable resolution so much more difficult.

>> [inaudible] thanks a lot for the speech. i learned a lot from it. i was not expecting you'd base your talk on le uric and turkey and brazil, so thanks for this wonderful narrative. i learned a lot. um, on the question of rhetoric and something that you mentioned, atmospheric. as an iranian who lives in the u.s., we have a different perspective, and i'm wondering how you could help the u.s. government in an area which i think is completely blindsided, and that is to do with the atmospheric and the rhetoric so to speak. when you mentioned president obama addressing the iranian people in february 2009, it was very cute. i would still vote for president obama, however, he was quoting persian poetry and talking about how wonderful these people are.

the same afternoon if you switch to cnn, the american audience were watching some bearded maniac blowing himself up, doing something crazy. so it's the atmospherics of telling persians themselves that you have wonderful poets, t really pretty -- it's really pretty pathetic. it's the americans who don't know the persians have wonderful poets. we know we have wonderful poets. [laughter] it's the americans -- [applause] the it's the americans who don't know that iran's contribution to the entire region of the middle east culturally is the equivalent of italy's contribution to europe. architecture, literature, gardens, cuisines -- [inaudible] gardens of the region are all persians, the word "paradise" is a persian word. iran has produced more poets than the entire region combined. so if we want to enter

diplomacy, we need to change the image of, oh, we're going to, you know, compromise with some hoodlums running around burning flags rather than we're going to go and have relations with would have been the most -- with one of the most profound cultures the world has known. it sounds trivial, but i think the american foreign policy approach to the conversation is condescending and really, sadly, ig national. so what -- [applause] >> thank you. um -- [laughter] let me put it this way, first of all. i take your point. i'm not here to defend the obama administration or any other government, but i think it's also important to keep in mind one thing. we cannot expect any government to do public diplomacy for another nation. over here. you, i think, as a person have done exactly what most people should do. you hold poetry classes, you're

spreading knowledge about this. this responsibility be of making sure that iran's contributions to world civilization falls on primarily iranians and iranian-americans, not on the obama administration. but the larger point that you're making that i think is correct is that the obama administration, as i said in my presentation, did not create space for their own policy. nor did the iranians. if you take a look at khamenei's response to obama's message, first of all, the noruz message was to the point and three and a half minutes long. khamenei went on for about an hour, and it was only the last couple of sentences toward the end of it in which he created an opening. there hasn't been any real effort on the iranian side as well to create preparedness on their end. now, the iranians may not have the same problem because i think it's a fair assessment to say that the iranian population may have significant problems with the united states' foreign

policy, but they don't have a problem, in fact, they have a lot of admiration for american values, american culture, for the american people. so it may not be necessary in the same way, but bottom line is after you have a 30-year-old enmity which i would call an institutionalized enmity, too many careers have been made on both sides in perpetuating this enmity. in order to change that, you cannot have diplomacy on a single roll of the dice. it needs sustainability, it needs effort, and you need to take the political risk and spend the political capital to make it happen. and i would say i think the iranians are at fault at this as well. they have not done their homework. but i think the expectation obama was so great, and i think he was genuine in his intent. but genuine intent is not sufficient. you have to have the willpower and the strength to do so. and there's a reason why the brazilians and the turks could succeed. the brazilians and the turks

engaged in more direct diplomacy with iran between october 2009 and may 2012 -- 2010 than the entire p5+1 combined. and they could do because in their domestic political audiences it was not a problem for them to engage with the iranians. certainly, there wasn't a problem for the turks. the brazilians had a couple of issues. there were some raised eyebrows as to why the president is spending so much time on this issue, but they had a political climate at home that made this possible. u.s. does not, the iranians do not, and i think any additional effort to do diplomacy needs to start at home in which, first, sufficient space and maneuverability is created for it. diplomacy has to be strong enough to overcome the last hurdle on the road. in the case of the united states and iran, it failed at the first hurdle. ..

to remove the powers in afghanistan and iraq. the real clear winner looks to be iran. the historic enemies have been removed and the u.s. dropped down forces in iraq and looks to be doing so in afghanistan by 2014. it will be a huge power vacuum in the region. my question is naturally iran would want to fill this vacuum. do you think it has willpower to

actually do this, to project power throughout the region? do you think it has the ability? a lot of iranian military equipment is stuff that hasn't been updated or maintained so my question is do you think iran wants to fill this power vacuum and will it be able? >> there has been a lot of concern that iran has some sort of hegemonic aspiration to recreate the persian empire in the middle east. i find it extremely unlikely. if the iranians were to manage to gain hegemony it would last no longer than a week or so. they do not have the side -- hard powersoft power after the arabs spring. with the arabs spring has done more than anything else at least in the short term is undermine

their sources of soft power and i recommend you read some of the -- it has been cutting edge. in the long run when you have these vacuum's of power in the region in which it doesn't have enormous framework on how state to state and direction should be there's a greater likelihood of conflict and precisely because of that we should take a second look at what turkey and other states can do in trying to get a more robust diplomacy happening. some elements in the region certainly in iran that would welcome the american departure from the region but the vacuum that will be created afterwards will more likely lead to states collapsing, interstate warfare rather than peace and stability and a new vision for the region. there's a reason for robust diplomacy and very few actors have the capability of pursuing

that. turkey is one of them. they have done quite well and ineffective in their diplomacy so far. we should take note of that and try to utilize that as much as possible if our interest is to create that type of peace. [inaudible] >> the u.s. foreign policy seems to stay pretty much the same throughout whether you have a democrat or republican in the office. i know we talked a little bit about rhetoric. the rhetoric on who is down but mostly for local consumption a lot of that rhetoric has an impact but does not impact u.s. foreign policy. do you feel that u.s. foreign policy is the same whether you have republican or democrat in the white house? do you see any change should

mitt romney be the next president of the united states in how we deal with iran? >> change for the worse is more likely than change for the better. i would agree with you. obviously there is bureaucratic inertia and institutions that are going to take a tremendous amount of willpower. one of the mistakes, shortcomings of this massive movement. they were hoping for other things. a lot of the grassroots kind of took a vacation once obama was in office. there was a belief that he is going to take care of this. bureaucrats who prefer the status quo and obama failed to reactivate his grass-roots.

we will not see any change. i don't believe it is quite possible, and this policy in the past has usually taken place during that time in which circumstances were different and the executive branch was stronger. it took place because there was a mass mobilization that was sustainable and they didn't go back home. this is not a criticism against any particular group. those who really want to see a significant change have to acknowledge that. just select a president. [inaudible]

>> we could have an opportunity to give you a place to go to show your courts where diplomacy, the lobby groupapac is having in the first week of march. it is one of the factors that put pressure on the government not to move towards diplomacy. in the spirit of the occupy movement and citizens around this country stepping up to the plate and calling for what they feel is right in this country and asking you to join us in occupied apac. [applause] >> that will be a saturday all day conference to learn about the issue and start the protests on sunday, monday and tuesday while apac will have their policy conference and lobbying congress. we want to be there with our

message of diplomacy. please go to the web site which is occupiedapac.org and join up with us. if you would like to sign up on our sheet we are on groups that mobilize very slowly to organize protests around the bellicose actions. and in february we would love to be in touch with you about all of those. sign up that occupyapac.org or on these sheets. >> in the context of the presidential election action implies -- >> into the microphone.

thank you. >> in the context of the presidential election of the united states can you foresee the obama administration -- some new effort with iran to improve its foreign policy credentials, more importantly if you see iran trying some initiative that would seem reasonable, the obama administration in a situation. >> thank you. the political space in an election year, elections in the united states in a couple months and parliamentary elections in march of this here in iraq. it doesn't look to be

necessarily the best circumstances. potentially a fruit in turkey at the end of this month which potentially a new round of diplomacy will take place. i would be somewhat cautious when it comes to this. too high expectations when it can achieve, lack of flexibility of both stocks. as we have seen more rhetoric is backing here and tensions are higher than ever before. you have lack of communication the persian gulf in particular can spark a larger conflict and there's another component. since the abandonment of diplomacy and assumption that seems to have gone into the obama administration's policy is the only time iran backtracked was in 2003. a credible military threat with

the invasion of iraq. and the invasion of afghanistan. it has been -- one has to recreate that perception of rats in order to get the iranians to come to the table to deal seriously or one could put it to capitulate. this is done not with the intent of starting a war. i do not believe the obama administration would like to go to war or has the intent for it. for the images ready for it and as a result maximize concessions out of the iranians and force them to the table. this is a tremendously risky and dangerous approach partly because the premise of it is questionable to begin with. even if you were to accept the premise. we have to remind ourselves the united states is only in control of its own actions.

it is not controlling how the iranians will read these actions or miss read these actions or miscalculate what the u.s. is doing and take an action that could spark a war that the u.s. may not be intending or the u.s. military does not seem to desire. furthermore it cannot control -- seems to have sufficient political willingness to try to control the actions of the israelis. we have seen when the level of tension rises to this high level you will need a small spark, perhaps an assassination of an iranian graduate student in order to be able to get the entire thing to explode. it is a risky proposition to try to create this image and hope that it would lead to negotiating benefit whereas in reality it can lead to a complete disaster and i would say i would read what secretary clinton did immediately after

the activation of the iranian scientists to be an indication that the u.s. is not intending war and is concerned and its allies may be trying to create the situation in which war would essentially be inevitable. she came out quickly not only did she condemn it but categorically denied the u.s. had anything to do with its assassination. never before have we seen u.s. secretary of state come out and in person do this. we have seen the obama administration condemn in writing some of these terrorist attacks that have taken place in iran but never before come out that swiftly. it likely was an effort to cool things down. the obama administration is looking to see how to escalate the situation after having engaged the last six seven months in something that cannot be described as anything else but to maximize the collation with additional sanctions and other things to create the

perception of an imminent military threat. [inaudible] >> are we being a little nike if in referring -- likely being naive when we refer to the denial by this administration of having anything to do with the assassination? are we being totally naive that it is true technically but we permitted israel to do the targeted assassination? the world and iran and the middle east sees anything that israel does as an exhibition -- extension of our approval. i want your thoughts on that and you just indicated that we are not playing a cat and mouse game with iran such that created an

incident that would allow us to convince congress we need to go to war and what would war with iran look like realistically? we invade countries that have no power, we go in and concord in three or four days. is it realistic to think about putting troops on the ground war is a war with iran, targeted assassinations and some analysts say we are currently at war with iran. i want your thoughts on the above. >> i personally don't believe the united states had any involvement, direct involvement in these assassinations. i said that based on conversations with people in the u.s. government and to see what they're trying to achieve. i don't see these actions being particularly helpful towards what they're trying to achieve.

keep in mind particularly this last assassination did not target anyone that was of any particular value to the nuclear program. this was not a critical person. more than anything else it was a provocation. something to undermine diplomatic track or spark a larger conflict and i don't think that is the intent of the administration. he want to be careful not to be nice eve and equally careful, exactly what the iranian and u.s. government have been doing which is to constantly read the worst intentions to the other side and when we do that we unfortunately make it navigable because we can never see anything but negative things from the other side. as to the issue of what war would look like i have come across a single serious analyst at wood describe war has anything short of at a minimum something that we simply cannot

predict and control. i spoke to a russian diplomat and their view was if there would be a war, from the eastern mediterranean to pakistan all the way into india. the iranian strategy, they will not fight another war on their territory. your option, whoever is attacking them throughout the region instead. i don't think people in the military understand this. if we are listening to what people in the u.s. military are saying, going from bob gates himself who said before he left office that anyone who would propose another invasion of the country in the middle east should have their head examined, some of the recent statements by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff or the previous chairman, mike mullen who made it very clear this absence of

diplomacy and dialogue between the united states is creating an unacceptably blurry situation in the persian gulf because we are misreading each other and when he misread the other side you tend to miscalculate. when you miscalculate you tend to escalate and before we know it we have a conflict. in my assessment you are not seeing a strong desire for this type of escalation in the u.s. military and as to your point about convincing congress you don't need to do anything to convince congress to declare that unfortunately. i don't think that is where the problem is as a pretext would be needed. with this current political climate i can definitely see that some elements of the political landscape outside the administration would be favorable to military action.

[inaudible] >> as a lawsuit in mexico looked at this issue and your last point to demonize other sites, i want to focus the issue and look at it from a perspective, february 12th, the central asian, international relations. this is an excerpt. it is blessed with abundant oil and gas that can enhance the region's, in europe and asia. the impact would be sources for u.s. commercial entry and

current policy, significant. former central asian soviet union's countries. the discovery of natural gas and oil resources is about 5% estimate of the world supply. what has been going on is china has overgrown the elephant in the room and everyone fears that oil prices around the world, how do you supply countries that have grown at 5% gdp every year. afghanistan or iran to supply -- could be a possibility. do we have the issue wrong? is the issue about nuclear-weapons? or is the issue about building the pipeline through iran and negotiations at an impasse?

>> i would have viewed these things as mutually exclusive. oil interests figuring in any larger policy the united states would pursue in the middle east. you can't ignore that but also to be little the idea that a nuclear weapon in iran would not have an impact on how it is being conducted in the region or the interests of other nations in the region would be affected is also somewhat problematic. i think part of the issue and you alluded to it, it doesn't seem like we have a comprehensive policy in which we take a look at all these different issues in a more holistic way and address these issues through a larger grant strategy in the region. the obama administration has the ambition to do so and it was interesting to see how they were creating a certain type of linkage between the israeli and palestinian issue and the iranian issue in a manner that

deeply upset the benjamin netanyahu government. in order to succeed these things there needs to be a level of stamina and persistence and perseverance that simply wasn't there. does that mean all hope is lost? i don't think so. there can be additional opportunities. particularly now seeing there's an awareness on both sides that were really cause to the edge of war may bring about a renewed interest and willingness to take a risk. i would caution against the audience saying to expect the administration to do so without the active support and perhaps active pressure by ordinary citizens would be erroneous. it won't happen unless ordinary people are really demanding and pushing for it. thank you so much. [applause]

>> you are watching 48 hours of nonfiction authors and books on c-span's booktv. >> why another book? ville >> you can't put everything in one book. liberty and tyranny was really a restatement of conservatism and non conservatism. a reintroduction of it because honestly i thought that the republican party had turned into mush and i thought it was with what the left was doing to remind people of conservatism, why it is so magnificent. why embraces liberty and private property rights and the rule of law and individual sovereignty and all these things that made america so great. and on the other hand left,

centralize and concentrate power and how much damage has been done in the last hundred years. it is tough to do that in 250 pages which i did but i said to myself later i really haven't gotten to the not of this thing which is what is this force that wears millions of people to it and then destroys their independence? they d and the politicians who put it are so effective in their propaganda and the phony and collectibles are so effective in the arguments they make. where does this come from? when did it start? i thought that had to be addressed if we are going in my view to save the country. the other point is where did our views come from? we talk about property rights but where did they come from? the founders didn't wake up and suddenly think about consent of the government, three branches

of government, where did this come from. i decided to focus on a few places and so i concluded that the problem we have is this utopian stadium. you can hear today where politicians say i will create a program and fix the mortgage situation. no they are not. they will create a program and incomes are going to be equalized. they are not going to be equalized. i'm going to create a program and do something else and all you have to do is surrender more and more of your liberty and assets and more of who you are and somehow they will continue -- fix the situation. where does this come from? this ideology? the problem is these notions are are fantasies.

this is the greatest country on civil society because our constitution is such a magnificent document. why would we surrender these things on these fantasies and these hopes and these claims? basically that is why i wrote this book. [applause] >> you mentioned the word stated them and if there's a word out of liberty and tyranny you have brought back to the american lexicon that is it. stated some. the fine a -- define "ameritopia" for me. >> i got to thinking after i go through a lot of philosophers. this is a book on political

philosophy. at the end it comes to get there. i tie it all together. thinking and ended liberty and tyranny this way. we are not a federal republic that a we got this massive bureaucracy. doesn't matter who is elected. just keep operating and pursuing an regulating no matter who you vote for. is not really representative republic anymore in that respect the there. so i thought what is it? it is not the america that the founders founded. is something else. and i think i came up with the name "ameritopia". i don't know where we are going with this. i don't think anybody knows

where we are going with it but there are aspects of tyranny that a lot of people don't feel a lot of people do feel. if you are a farmer today you are being put upon like never before by the environmental protection agency. if you're a rancher you are being put upon like never before by the interior department. we have got private property owners under attack all over this country. we have business, small-business under attack in every direction and it is getting much worse and we hear these politicians talk about you have to have skin in the game. skin in the game. is that what we were founded for? to have skin in the game? we were founded for them to make sure our liberty is protected. not for us to give skin in the game for the bureaucrats and politicians. so basically the title in one word, one word that kind of explains it and explained it

more in the book and that is "ameritopia". a mix between america and this utopian. >> you can watch this and other things online at booktv.org. >> with the current health care legislation constitutional court cases being heard by the supreme court next week booktv will be airing several of their programs related to health care. at 9:30 eastern we bring you linda greenehouse giving a short introduction to the supreme court. alan mcginnis is after that discussing a series of essays written by the staff of the washington post on the recently passed health care legislation. at 11:00 a.m. eastern jonathan gruber, director of the health care program at the national bureau of economic research presents his thoughts on health care. his book is health care reform:what it is, why it is necessary and how it works. and sally pike's perspective in her book the pike plan. she argues against president